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LUCIAN BLAGA: AN AMERICAN PRAGMATIST 
 IN EUROPE 
Michael S. Jones 
Liberty University, Virginia 
Introduction 
There is no contradiction between the assertion that Lucian Blaga 
was an original thinker and the admission that the influence of 
numerous other thinkers can be seen in his work. Blaga composed a 
systematic philosophy whose single most striking feature may be its 
creativity. Nonetheless, the influences of many preceding 
philosophers are unmistakably evident in his opus. The neo-Kantian 
aspects of Blaga’s philosophy are well documented.1 The Neo-
Platonic elements, and, Blaga’s dispute with Stăniloae not 
withstanding, the related influence of Orthodox theology and 
Orthodox religion,2 virtually shout themselves to the non-Orthodox 
reader. The similarities between Blaga’s philosophy of culture and 
1
 See G. G. Constandache, “Critique of the Unconscious: Kantian 
Influences in the Works of Lucian Blaga.” Man and World 30 (1997): 
445-452; Petru Ioan, “Matricea Kantiană a Filosofiei Lui Blaga.” Revista 
de Filosofie 44 (1997): 213-221. Blaga alludes to the influence of Kant 
and also of Marburg neo-Kantianism in his autobiography, Hronicul şi 
cântecul vârstelor, vol. 6 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucureşti: Editura 
Minerva, 1979), 129. Kant’s influence on Blaga is very clearly seen on 
page 56 of Cultură şi cunoştiinŃă, where Blaga writes that the most 
significant problem in the theory of knowledge is that of the categories. 
Blaga devotes a whole chapter of this book to this problem, Lucian Blaga, 
“Categoriile,” in Cultură şi cunoştiinŃă, vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga 
(Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983). 
2
 On the influence of Orthodoxy, see Vasile Băncilă, Lucian Blaga, 
energie românească, 2nd ed. (Timişoara, RO: Marineasa, 1995), 80. 
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Spengler’s cultural morphology are well known.3 Many other 
influences have been detected in Blaga’s philosophy as well. 
Scholars have noted the parallel between Blaga’s differentials and 
Leibniz’s monads,4 a possible relation between Blaga’s 
epistemological modesty and the subjectivism of German 
Romanticism,5 the important influence of Freud and Jung on 
Blaga’s understanding of the subconscious,6 and even certain 
similarities between Blaga’s thought and Indian philosophies.7 
However, one very American aspect of Blaga’s philosophy seems 
to have escaped notice by most of Blaga’s Romanian 
commentators. This aspect is his epistemological Pragmatism. It is 
the thesis of this article that Blaga’s philosophy contains all of the 
elements necessary for him to be considered a pragmatist in the 
American sense of the term. 
In order to sustain this thesis, I will need to accomplish two 
things. First, I must briefly describe what it means to be a 
pragmatist in the context of American philosophy. Second, I must 
show that Blaga’s philosophy fits this description. 
                                                 
3
 Michael S. Jones, “Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture: More than a 
Spenglerian Adaptation,” Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, seria 
Philosophia, XLVIII: 1-2 (2003), 167-174; Alexandru Boboc, “Blaga, 
Nietzsche si Spengler. Demersuri moderne asupra paradigmei <<stil>>,” 
Seculum, serie noua, 1:3-4 (1995), 28-34. 
4
 Lucian Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, in vol. 11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga 
(Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988), 95, 165ff. 
5
 Vasile Muscă, “Specificul creaŃiei culturale româneşti în câmpul 
filosofiei” in Lucian Blaga – cunoaştere şi creaŃie (Bucharest: Cartea 
Românească, 1987), 468-469. 
6
 Liviu Antonesei, “Repere pentru o filosofie a culturii,” in Ghise, Botez, 
and Botez, Lucian Blaga – cunoaştere şi creaŃie, 402ff; Muscă, 
“Specificul creaŃiei culturale româneşti în câmpul filosofiei,” 471, 473 
7
 Mircea Itu, Indianismul lui Blaga, (Braşov: Editura Orientul Latin, 
1996); see also Lucian Blaga, Hronicul şi cântecul vârstelor, 174. 
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Pragmatism Defined 
Pragmatism is a school of thought. Like many schools of thought, 
those thinkers who are considered to belong to this school differ 
from each other on so many points that scholars have found it 
difficult to single out exactly what elements are pragmatism’s 
defining characteristics. There is a popular conception of 
pragmatism as an attitude that espouses a practical approach to 
resolving difficult or problematic situations. However, this simple 
conception of pragmatism is not an adequate description of the 
philosophical school that bears the name. As Philip Wiener has 
observed, “We cannot simply equate the “pragmatic” with the 
“practical” as is so commonly done by popular writers.”8  
Pragmatism may be thought of as a school of philosophical 
thought that is characterized by a set of attitudes and doctrines most 
of which are shared by most of its proponents. In this, Pragmatism 
is a “family resemblance” in the Wittgensteinian sense: not all of 
the family traits are visible in every member of the family, but each 
member bears enough of the traits in order to be recognized as 
belonging to that family. John J. Stuhr, in the introduction to 
Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy,9 discusses what 
he considers to be the essential elements of classical American 
Pragmatism. He lists the following seven themes that can be traced 
through the writings of Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, 
and Mead: 1. Rejection of the practices and options that had 
become the accepted tradition of modern philosophy. 2. A fallibilist 
view of the human epistemic situation. 3. A pluralist view of human 
                                                 
8
 Philip P. Wiener, “Pragmatism,” in The Dictionary of the History of 
Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, Philip P. Wiener, ed. (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973-74), vol. 3, 553, 
http://www.pragmatism.org/companion/pragmatism_wiener.htm. Viewed 
4/1/2005. 
9
 John J. Stuhr, ed. Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: 
Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 1-7. 
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experiences and values. 4. A radical empiricism in which it is 
recognized that the subject is active (rather than passive) in 
experience and that experience admits of no subject-object 
distinction. 5. The methodological continuity of science and 
philosophy as pragmatically justified experimental inquiries. 6. The 
belief that one goal of philosophy should be the improvement of the 
human situation. 7. An emphasis on the social context of all human 
endeavors. 
The details of this analysis of the core of Pragmatism could be 
disputed. Most, and perhaps all, of the characteristics that Stuhr lists 
can be found in other schools of philosophy. It might also be argued 
that some of them might better be seen as secondary traits not 
central to the movement. However, from these themes enumerated 
and elaborated by Stuhr can be distilled a draught that flows from 
the very headwaters of American Pragmatism. This draught is 
epistemological by nature. The sine qua non of pragmatism is its 
particular approach to the theory of knowledge. 
 
Pragmatism’s Negative Element 
The epistemology of American Pragmatism contains two essential 
elements, one negative and the other positive. The negative element 
is a response to the objectivist epistemological tradition of the 
West. From Descartes through to 19th and 20th century Positivism, 
and continuing in some figures in contemporary analytic and 
phenomenological philosophy, the Western epistemological 
tradition has pursued the goal of apodictic certainty and has sought 
objective criteria of truth. Postmodern philosophy has gained fame 
by repudiating this goal. However, even before Derrida, Foucault, 
Lyotard, et al. pronounced the end of modernity, Pragmatists such 
as James and Dewey had presented strong arguments showing that 
beliefs are historically situated, that knowledge is a construct, and 
that the criteria that one employs in making assessments of truth are 
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subjective and contingent upon the perspective of the person doing 
the assessing.10 
Going against the current of epistemological objectivism, 
Pragmatists have argued for a much more “modest” epistemology, 
one that is more in keeping with human nature and the situation in 
which we find ourselves. This is evident in James’ understanding of 
the nature of truth. James embraces a multi-faceted theory that 
combines correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic elements.11 
According to James, the pragmatist view of truth is part of a 
process-oriented epistemology that relates to a process-
metaphysical world. Because the world is dynamic rather than 
static, truth is changing, and therefore human beliefs must change 
along with it. Therefore beliefs are necessarily both constructivist 
and contextual: “...the absolute truth will have to be made, made as 
a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of verification-
experience... so far as reality means experienceable reality, both it 
and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of 
mutation – mutation towards a definite goal, it may be – but still 
mutation.”12 
This epistemological modesty in Pragmatism is also reflected in 
Dewey’s instrumentalist approach to Pragmatism, the contextualism 
of which is sensitive to the developing contexts of belief. Dewey 
was aware of this, and saw it as a key feature of Pragmatism: 
“‘pragmatism’ is, in its truth, just the fact that the empiricist does 
10
 Wiener emphasizes this anti-objectivist aspect of Pragmatism, 551-570. 
11
 There are places in James’ writing that seem to oppose the 
correspondence theory of truth, but what he is really opposing in these 
places is a view of the correspondence theory that assumes a static view of 
reality. See James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking  (New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1907), 198, 223; Charley 
D. Hardwick and Donald A. Crosby, editors, Pragmatism, Neo-
Pragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty, (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1997), 206. 
12
 James, Pragmatism, 224-5; see also Hardwick, 206. 
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take account of the experienced ‘drift, occasion and contexture’ of 
things experienced.”13 The constructivism of Dewey’s Pragmatism 
is reflected in his bold statement: “... knowing is an act which 
modifies what previously existed... its worth consists in the 
consequences of the modification.”14 
These same features are found in contemporary Pragmatism as 
well. Richard Rorty, for example, speaks as a contextualist when he 
states that “getting rid of ‘the view from nowhere’ – the idea of a 
sort of knowing that has nothing to do with agency, values, or 
interests – might have considerable cultural importance.”15 He 
speaks as a constructivist when he argues that “every belief, no 
matter how primitive or vicious, corresponds to some ‘world’ – the 
‘world’ that contains the objects mentioned by the belief (Ptolemy’s 
crystalline spheres or the subhuman nature of the slaves.)”16 
Historicism and constructivism are the central themes of Joseph 
Margolis’ book “Historied Thought, Constructed World.”17 
Margolis’ perspectivism is clearly seen in his statement, “the choice 
of truth-values (or truth-like values) assigned, as a matter of policy 
or principle, to any sector of inquiry is a function, under symbiosis, 
                                                 
13
 Dewey, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,”  in Stuhr, 459. 
14
 John Dewey, “The Quest for Certainty,” 245, quoted in Forrest Oran 
Wiggins, “William James and John Dewey,” in The Personalist 23 (1942), 191. 
15
 Rorty, 45. 
16
 Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, 1-2. In this passage Rorty is not 
defending the correspondence theory of truth: on the contrary, he is 
employing argumentum ad absurdum against it in order to substitute for 
correspondence a (presumably) more pragmatic theory of truth, one that is 
similar to Dewey’s instrumentalism. However, Rorty also argues that a 
coherent theory of the nature of truth is not possible, and states that James 
denied the correspondence theory (p.3). I consider both of these points 
highly improbable. Regarding the latter, see James, Pragmatism, 198, 223. 
17
 Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual 
Primer for the Turn of the Millennium. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995. 
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of what we take to be the nature of the domain in question,” and 
again, “Everything that exists and is real is socially constructed.”18 
Pragmatism’s Positive Element 
Counterbalancing this negative element of Pragmatism is a positive 
element that is Pragmatism’s most noted feature: a de facto 
criterion of truthfulness.19 The traditional criterion of truthfulness is 
correspondence with reality: a proposition is true if what it asserts 
corresponds to the way things actually are.20 However, how to 
determine the truth of a proposition using the correspondence 
criterion is quite a boondoggle: it may be just as difficult to 
determine whether or not a proposition corresponds to reality as it is 
to determine whether or not it is true. In essence, correspondence as 
a criterion may be a begging of the question. As a result of this and 
other considerations, correspondence as a criterion of truthfulness 
has received much criticism,21 and alternative criteria have been 
proposed. 
The most prominent of these alternatives is coherence: a 
proposition is taken to be true if it functions coherently within a 
system of beliefs.22 Another theory, one that combines 
correspondence and coherence, suggests that a proposition is known 
to be true iff it can be shown to correspond to reality or is properly 
18
 Margolis, 65, 151. 
19
 Some contemporary pragmatists eschew the notion of criteria of 
truthfulness as being a remnant of the supposedly “discredited 
correspondence theory of truth” (Rorty, i) and therefore substitute notions 
such as value in its place. 
20
 Brad Dowden and Norman Swartz, “Truth,” in James Fieser and 
Bradley Dowden, ed., The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm#H3, viewed 4/6/2005. 
21
 See, for example, Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
22
 Keith Lehrer, “Coherentism,” in Dancy and Sosa, 67-70. 
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related to propositions that can be shown to correspond to reality.23 
The former of these views seems to overlook the meaning of the 
word truth in ordinary language; the later suffers from the same 
question-begging shortcoming as does the coherence theory. A third 
alternative is presented by deflationary theories of truth, which 
view assertions of truthfulness not as descriptions but rather as 
endorsements indicating what the speaker believes about the 
proposition.24 However, this theory offers no criterion of 
truthfulness. 
Pragmatism offers a unique solution to the problem of criteria 
of truthfulness. This solution honors the ordinary use of the term 
“truth” and at the same time offers a criterion of truthfulness that 
avoids begging the question. Pragmatism suggests that a 
proposition is true if it succeeds when put into practice. In this 
context, to succeed is to be useful in resolving cognitive or practical 
problems, such as problems of scientific, technical, ethical, or 
religious inquiry. Ideas are viewed as adaptive means of action; 
therefore the propositions which express them are true only insofar 
as they are able to adapt actions (and thoughts) to various 
circumstances. 
James did not reject correspondence and coherence as criteria 
of truthfulness. However, he did observe that there are many truth-
contexts in which neither empirical correspondence nor coherence 
is appropriate. To James, these areas are among the most important 
areas of human existence: religious practice, ethical decision, 
aesthetic choice, etc.25 In these areas the criteria of “satisfaction” 
                                                 
23
 See Susan Hack’s proposed “foundherentism,” in Timm Triplett, Recent 
Work on Foundationalism, American Philosophical Quarterly 27 no. 2 
(April 1990), 107-108. 
24
 Paul Horwich, “Theories of Truth,” in Dansy and Sosa, 511-514.  
25
 For James, “this entire spectrum of objective knowledge of matters of 
fact merely provides the stage, setting and backdrop for the really 
important issues of our lives. The important questions are not about 
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and “power” are more appropriate.26 By “satisfaction” James means 
expedience in a particular context. This is the most clearly 
pragmatic area of James’ theory of truth. A belief is “true” (or taken 
to be true, considered to be true) if it satisfies a person’s need to 
perform a task at a particular time. James’ famous statement, “You 
can say of it then either that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it 
is true because it is useful.’ Both these phrases mean the same 
thing...”27, expresses his view concisely. 
James proposes a pragmatist approach to justification: 
consequentialism. This approach encompasses evidential 
justification where appropriate, but does not rely on it exclusively. 
According to consequentialist justification, a belief is justified iff it 
produces desirable consequences. If two competing beliefs both 
produce desirable consequences, the one that produces the best 
consequences is justified, or the one that produces desirable 
consequences most reliably is justified. If a particular ethical 
system can be seen to produce the best consequences, that ethical 
system is justified. If religion produces desirable consequences that 
would not be had without religion, then religion is justified. 
Dewey’s “instrumentalism” is a pragmatist approach to 
knowledge wherein knowing is viewed as an activity that is 
directed towards the overcoming of the “problematic situations” 
that arise during enquiry. Knowing is an experiment: conclusions 
are tentative hypotheses that may be revised when a new 
problematic is confronted. This is reflected in Dewey’s pragmatic 
description of truth, “Just as to say an idea was true all the time is a 
way of saying in retrospect that it has come out in a certain fashion, 
so to say that an idea is “eternally true” is to indicate prospective 
modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated. Its 
                                                                                                     
matters of fact, but about our justification as persons and whether our lives 
are worth living.” Hardwick, 210. 
26
 Hardwick, 212. 
27
 James, Pragmatism, 204. 
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meaning, therefore, is strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate a 
property inherent in the idea as intellectualized existence, but 
denotes a property of use and employment.”28 
In instrumentalism, ideas or thoughts are instruments that relate 
experiences, making predictions possible, which guides actions. 
These predictions (and consequent actions) are in turn tested by 
other experiences, which show whether or not the actions are 
expedient, and therefore whether the predictions were true. In this 
scenario, “true” is seen to refer retrospectively to the value of ideas 
or thoughts and predictions judged according to their effectiveness 
in guiding actions expediently. A proposition, then, is taken to be 
true if it is thought that it will effectively serve to predictively guide 
actions, or retrospectively is taken to be true if it has been seen to 
be an effective guide to actions.29  
These views from early Pragmatism are reflected in the thought 
of contemporary pragmatists. A pragmatic tendency is evident, for 
instance, in W. V. Quine’s program of naturalized epistemology 
when he writes: “But why all this creative reconstruction, all this 
make-believe? …Why not just see how this construction really 
proceeds? … If we are out simply to understand the link between 
observation and science, we are well advised to use any available 
information, including that provided by the very science whose link 
with observation we are seeking to understand.”30 According to 
Quine, the traditional projects of epistemology no longer offer any 
hope of success, and the task that remains for epistemology is the 
psychological one of analyzing how human cognition succeeds to 
the degree that it does. The truth of cognition is evident in its 
                                                 
28
 John Dewey, quoted  in Stuhr, 436 (italics are Dewey’s). 
29
 Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’ Press, 
1979), 175. 
30
 W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969, 75-76. 
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functionality: therefore the task of epistemology is not the 
justification, but rather the explication, of our belief mechanisms.31 
Although there are significant differences between Quine and 
Rorty, Rorty also evidences this pragmatic view of justification. 
“…the question ‘Do our practices of justification lead to truth?’ is 
as unanswerable as it is unpragmatic. It is unanswerable because 
there is no way to privilege our current purposes and interests. It is 
unpragmatic because the answer to it would make no difference 
whatever to our practice. But surely, it will be objected, we know 
that we are closer to truth. Surely we have been making both 
intellectual and moral progress. Certainly we have been making 
progress, by our lights. That is to say, we are much better able to 
serve the purposes we wish to serve, and to cope with the situations 
we believe we face, than our ancestors would have been. But when 
we hypostatise the adjective ‘true’ into ‘Truth’ and ask about our 
relation to it, we have absolutely nothing to say.”32 Rorty’s point 
seems to be that our beliefs are justified by their successes rather 
than by their relationship to some abstract ideal of truth. 
Thus we have seen that Pragmatism contains two seminal 
moments, one negative and the other positive. We shall now see 
that both of these key elements are present in the epistemology of 
Lucian Blaga. 
Blaga’s Philosophy 
Blaga’s philosophical writings encompass a systematic philosophy 
that includes most of the major divisions of modern philosophy. 
This fact distinguishes Blaga from most American Pragmatists, who 
tended to avoid constructing philosophical systems along the lines 
of traditional philosophy. Furthermore, one of the most striking and 
central features of Blaga’s system is his elaborate metaphysical 
proposal. Although many of Blaga’s insights could stand on their 
31
 Quine, 82-83. 
32
 Rorty, 3-4. 
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own without the support of his metaphysics, it is precisely the 
metaphysics that binds the various elements of his philosophy 
together as a system. This significantly separates Blaga from 
American Pragmatists, since the great majority of Pragmatists have 
disavowed speculative metaphysics in favor of what they see as a 
more empirical and more practical focus to philosophy.33 Although 
Blaga’s metaphysics does relate to the empirical and has significant 
practical implications, it is perhaps best described as a conjectural 
and suggestive heuristic. 
However, although most Pragmatists have eschewed 
speculative metaphysics, there have been exceptions. Peirce, for 
example, held a metaphysical/epistemological view that included 
“psycho-physical monism,” the belief that the physical universe is 
essentially mind.34 Most American Pragmatists have espoused 
metaphysical realism, either implicitly or explicitly, and although 
they may refrain from elaborating metaphysical systems, this does 
not protect them from the accusation of harboring metaphysical 
views. Margolis’ previously-cited book, for example, can be read as 
being precisely a (anti-metaphysical) metaphysics.35 
These examples indicate that it is not the absence (or presence) 
of speculative metaphysics that makes one a Pragmatist. Nor is it 
the particular conclusions that one reaches in one’s philosophizing: 
Pragmatists range from left to right across the range of 
                                                 
33
 Stuhr, 3. 
34
 Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/peirce/>. Viewed 
4/24/2005. 
35
 In support of this interpretation, it need only be noted that Margolis 
considers the following metaphysical assertion to be the first of six 
“master themes” from his book: “There is no principled difference 
between the world (the world as it is, independent of our inquiry) and the 
intelligible world (the world as it appears to us to be). Call that doctrine 
symbiosis.” Margolis, 300. 
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philosophical issues. Rather it is the presence of the aforementioned 
two elements, one negative and the other positive, in one’s 
epistemology that qualifies one as a Pragmatist in the American 
sense. Therefore in spite of the prominence of metaphysics in 
Blaga’s philosophy, if these two elements can be shown to be 
present in Blaga’s epistemology, one may say that, in his 
epistemology if not in his philosophical tradition, Blaga is a 
Pragmatist. 
 
A Similar Negative Element in Blaga’s Epistemology 
That there is a prominent and very important epistemological 
modesty in Blaga’s theory of knowledge is doubtless very well 
known by all who have studied Blaga’s philosophy. Both 
epistemological and metaphysical considerations lead Blaga to 
assert that “positive-adequate cognition” is not humanly possible.36 
Epistemologically, Blaga analyzes cognition into the following 
seven theoretically possible “modes”: 1. Positive-adequate 
cognition. 2. Quasi-cognition. 3. Negative cognition. 4. Cognition 
which is in part positive-adequate and in part quasi-cognition. 5. 
Cognition which is in part positive-adequate and in part negative 
cognition. 6. Cognition which is in part positive-adequate, in part 
quasi-cognition, and in part negative cognition. 7. Cognition which 
is in part quasi-cognition and in part negative cognition.37 
According to Blaga’s analysis, only the second (quasi-cognition) 
and the seventh (part quasi- and part negative-cognition) of these 
modes are humanly realizable. The first mode listed, positive-
adequate cognition, is realized by the Great Anonymous. 
                                                 
36
 Blaga’s term “positive-adequate cognition” refers to that mode of 
cognition that accurately grasps its object in all of the object’s aspects and 
details. Blaga also refers to this as "absolute cognition." Using language 
common in analytic philosophy, positive-adequate cognition would be 
described as that cognition which has a 100% correspondence to its object. 
37
 Lucian Blaga, Cenzura Transcendentă in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli 
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983), 545-6; see also 529ff. 
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Blaga articulates an interesting argument for the thesis that 
humans do not have positive-adequate cognition. In brief, his 
argument is that, by definition, cognition is an act wherein the 
subject surpasses itself in possessing the cognitive object. By 
definition a phenomenon is an existence centered in itself. 
Therefore cognition cannot be a phenomenon. This leaves two 
possible conclusions regarding cognition: either it is something 
paradoxical, an existent non-phenomenon, or it does not exist. 
Blaga favors the latter conclusion, and argues that all human 
“cognition” is mere quasi-cognition, either distorting its objects or 
incomplete in its grasp of them.38 
One of the most interesting parts of Blaga’s philosophy is his 
discussion of specific modes of cognition permitted to humanity in 
order to allow humans to approach the unknown, to cognize 
mystery. These are the three forms of “luciferic cognition.” These 
approaches do not eliminate mystery, but they allow a deeper 
understanding of mystery or an accumulation of information about 
the mysterious.39 The preservation of mystery even in luciferic 
cognition is another indication of Blaga’s epistemological modesty. 
Another important aspect of Blaga’s epistemology is its 
constructivism. Constructivism, the view that human knowledge is 
a human construction, is an ubiquitous element of Blaga’s 
philosophy. This open acceptance of constructivism is seen in his 
freely creative metaphysics. It is also reflected in his epistemology 
in the role accorded to culture and in the analyses of mythic, occult, 
paradisiac, and luciferic cognition. That human knowledge would 
be a human creative construct is no surprise once one understands 
Blaga’s metaphysics. The human destiny to be a creator, ever 
provoked to this effort by the abilities and limits given to 
humankind by the Great Anonymous, leaves no option but that 
                                                 
38
 Blaga, Cenzura Transcendentă, 505-6. 
39
 See Lucian Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli 
Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983). 
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humanity will strive to cognize the unknown without ever quite 
reaching it. This scenario sounds macabre, but seen from within 
Blaga’s metaphysics it becomes a gift to humankind and to 
creation: to humankind, because it gives humanity purpose and 
pleasure; to creation, because it perpetuates creativity while at the 
same time protecting creation from potential self-destruction. 
There have been numerous other constructivist philosophers, 
and it cannot be said that Blaga was the first. Nonetheless, there are 
several important things about Blaga’s constructivism that make it 
particularly noteworthy. The first of these is how neatly and 
consistently constructivism fits within the larger philosophical 
picture that Blaga paints. Blaga’s philosophical system gives 
constructivism a context, an explanation, and a purpose that are 
sometimes lacking in other constructivist philosophies. A second 
noteworthy aspect of Blaga’s constructivism is that it is argued for 
in a wide variety of cognitive contexts: Blaga shows that human 
thought is constructivist whether it occurs in math, in the natural 
sciences, in philosophy, in theology, in the arts, or in any other 
cognitive context.40 A third important aspect of Blaga’s 
constructivism is how it is argued: Blaga does not cease being a 
constructivist when he argues for his own philosophical system. He 
views his own system as merely a possible thesis supported (but not 
proved) by evidence and pragmatic utility. Therefore he does not 
seek a foundationalist justification of his system: he argues for his 
system using evidences and illustrations taken from a wide variety 
of intellectual domains, and by showing the fruitfulness of his 
proposals for further philosophical research. He does not try to 
prove his system beyond all possible doubt. Were he to attempt to 
                                                 
40
 See Traian Pop,  “InteligenŃă şi intuiŃie în cunoaştere,” in Introducere în 
filosofia lui Lucian Blaga, 141-146. Although each of these modes of 
cognition is unique in comparison to the others, they also share certain 
elements, including constructivism, and Blaga considers them to be 
equally valid ways of approaching mystery, Blaga, FiinŃa istorică, in vol. 
11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucureşti: Editura Minerva, 1988), 508. 
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show that his theory is apodictically certain, he would be 
inconsistent with his own system. However, that he does not argue 
for the certainty of his system does not indicate that he does not 
believe his system to be correct. On the contrary, it indicates that he 
views his system as correct, and that because it is correct, he must 
conduct his philosophizing as a constructivist, which entails 
viewing his own system as a human construct. 
The idea that human cognitive ability is limited is not at all 
new. Much more interesting is Blaga’s explanation of these limits 
and his hypothesis about their source and purpose. According to 
Blaga, both the ability of human cognition and the limits imposed 
upon this ability are results of the “grace” extended to creation and 
the care exercised over creation by the Great Anonymous. The 
purpose of these measures is the protection, preservation, and 
promotion of creation. Individual cognition is permitted within very 
specific limits: when knowledge is of a type that is “positive-
adequate” it is strictly limited with regard to its extent. When 
knowledge is of a type that is in principle unlimited, it is strictly 
censored in regard to its accuracy.41 Blaga’s term for this limitation 
is “transcendent censorship.” This censorship fulfills the purpose of 
the Great Anonymous of spurring human creativity, providing an 
outlet to this inner human yearning, and at the same time preserving 
the order of the cosmos. Blaga poignantly suggests that these limits 
imposed upon cognition both shape cognition and facilitate its 
fruitfulness.42 
In Blaga’s metaphysics there are two important measures 
employed by the source of the cosmos in preservation of cosmic 
equilibrium. One of these has already been discussed: transcendent 
censorship. The other is differentiated creation, the main subject of 
41
 This is discussed at length in Cenzura transcendentă and more briefly 
on 529ff of Cunoaşterea luciferică. 
42
 Blaga, Cenzura transcendentă, 461: “Although water fights against the 
riverbanks, without the banks the river would no longer be a river.” 
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his book “Divine Differentials”.43 Blaga hypothesizes that the 
human epistemological predicament is an intentional result of the 
way that the creator (The Great Anonymous) formed the world. The 
creator formed (and forms) the world through the emanation of 
what Blaga calls “differentials.” These are the fundamental matter 
of the universe, the combination of which creates all that we 
know.44 The Great Anonymous regulates the types of differentials 
that are emanated and how the differentials combine in order to 
assure that they do not jeopardize the well being of creation.45 Since 
the continued supreme governance of the Great Anonymous is 
essential to the well being of the cosmos, part of this regulating 
involves the limiting of all aspects of creation so that no rival to the 
Great Anonymous may arise. For this reason human cognition is 
regulated and limited. This is Blaga’s metaphysical explanation of 
the limits of human cognition, a creative and illuminating, even if 
not highly scientific, theory. 
A Similar Positive Element in Blaga’s Epistemology 
The negative element in Pragmatism is counterbalanced by an 
equally important positive element: the pragmatic criterion of 
truthfulness. Blaga’s epistemological modesty is also 
counterbalanced by a significant and well-developed theory of the 
criteria of truthfulness. Like James, Blaga’s theory retains 
correspondence in his definition of truth46 and coherence as a 
criterion of truthfulness.47 He observes that internal criteria of 
43
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine. 
44
 Blaga states that the substance of the differentials is not an empirical 
substance. The differentials are more basic than quanta, which are 
complex energy entities and are composed of differentials. All material, 
psychical, and spiritual entities are composed of differentials. Blaga, 
DiferenŃialele divine, 95-96. 
45
 Blaga, DiferenŃialele divine, 77. 
46
 Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică, 381. 
47
 Blaga, Cunoaşterea luciferică, 381. 
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verification are limited to showing that a theory cannot be verified: 
coherence never serves as a positive mode of verification. Therefore 
it seems that Blaga views coherence as a necessary but not 
sufficient criterion of truthfulness. Correspondence, on the other 
hand, seems to be viewed by Blaga as a sufficient but not necessary 
criterion of truth. If a statement can be shown to correspond to what 
it is describing, it stands as verified, but the inability to show that 
this relation pertains does not falsify a statement. 
A difficulty with correspondence as a criterion of truth is how 
the relationship of correspondence is verified. Blaga is definitely 
concerned that statements have the correct relationship to “external” 
reality, but he is aware that verifying this relationship is 
problematic,48 and consists of a tentative evaluation based upon the 
success or failure of the statement when put into application. Thus 
while Blaga may have a correspondence theory of truth, he clearly 
disavows correspondence as a criterion of verification.49 
In discussing his own theory of truth, Blaga writes, “The 
external criterion consists in a relation of the theory to plan A 
48
 See especially Blaga, Geneza metaforei şi sensul culturii (Bucureşti: 
FundaŃia pentru Literatură şi Artă “Regele Carol II”, 1937), 417, “There 
certainly exists a nominal definition of truth, understood as the equation 
between an idea and reality. But this ideal definition is equivalent to a 
simple postulate, for the realization of which no certainty is given to us, 
nor any criteria of judgement nor possibility of a test.” 
49
 Also on page, 409 of Cunoaşterea luciferică he writes, "Let us 
presuppose that in truth there exists a 'reality in itself'… The single thing 
which can be affirmed about knowledge in relation to a reality in itself is 
that we cannot know whether knowledge is able to contain reality in itself, 
nor whether it is not." While Blaga admits some importance to a 
correspondence between propositions and that which they are attempting 
to describe, his advocating of the theory of transcendent censorship proves 
that he does not believe that a proposition can ultimately correspond to 
reality (whatever that would entail). This is made clear in Cenzura 
transcendentă 506, where he describes cognition as a “catching hold of” 
an object, and says that such an act is only incompletely possible. 
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effectively realized.”50 The phrase “effectively realized” hints at his 
solution to the problem of criteria of truthfulness and the 
verification of correspondence: there is a distinctly pragmatic aspect 
to Blaga’s view of verification. His criterion for judging 
correspondence is pragmatic, as is seen in his statement, 
“Verifiability consists, as was proved, in the ‘actualization’ of the 
empirical potential of a theory. This signifies something completely 
different than the correspondence of the theory to a ‘reality in 
itself.’”51 Blaga seems to be aware of the circularity of proposing 
correspondence as both the definition of truth and the criterion of 
truthfulness. He appears to avoid this by proposing that the criterion 
according to which a proposition should be accepted as 
corresponding to reality and therefore as true is how effective the 
proposition is when put into practice. This is remarkably like the 
criterion of truthfulness advocated by American Pragmatists. 
That a pragmatic criterion is in fact what Blaga advocates can 
be seen from his own practice. Blaga does not philosophize like 
Socrates, proceeding dialectically, nor like Descartes, attempting to 
build a philosophical system upon some infallible first premise(s). 
Blaga philosophizes by suggesting new theories and then showing 
their fruitfulness. It is this fruitfulness, in Blaga’s eyes, that 
vindicates many of his most significant proposals. When in his 
epistemology Blaga proposes the theory of “plus cognition” and 
then argues for the truth of his theory by reference to its success in 
explaining the intellectual process employed in numerous scientific 
advances, he is utilizing a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness.52 
When in his metaphysics Blaga proposes that the cosmos and its 
teleology are best explained by a system that posits the existence of 
an intelligent creator as the source of the universe, and then 
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supports this hypothesis by showing its rich and extensive 
explanatory power, his argument utilizes the pragmatic theory of 
verification.53 
This same approach to verification is seen in Blaga's 
philosophy of science. In one passage, commenting on the nature of 
scientific progress, he writes, “With what right does he (Einstein) 
transform a 'paradoxical finding' into a 'principle'? With one single 
right. With the right that is given to him by the theoretical fruits 
which this change of accent has been able to bear.”54 There may be 
times when science proceeds via the gradual accumulation and 
analysis of data, and when one scientific theory overturns a 
previously accepted one by means of this process. However, it is 
very often the case that scientific data is open to more than one very 
plausible interpretation. In the latter case, a criterion other than 
correspondence is needed to determine which theory is most valid. 
In such a situation a scientific theory is not accepted as true because 
it corresponds to reality and rival theories do not: that would be 
question-begging. In this situation a theory is accepted as true 
because it is seen that it works.55 
53
 Blaga, Cenzura transcendentă, 450, "Forced to choose between 
incomplete justifications, we can make a concession to the critic, namely 
that of viewing the proposition of the Great Anonymous as a simple point 
of view. The value of this point of view will be measured through the 
results which it has the gift to bring." 
54
 Blaga, ŞtiinŃă şi creaŃie , in vol. 10 of Opere (Bucureşti: FundaŃia 
Regală, 1946), 162. 
55
 This is admittedly an oversimplification of the pragmatic criterion. 
There are complications: theories can work without being true, and there 
are other important factors that influence the acceptance of a scientific 
theory. This oversimplification, for purposes of succinctness, is mine, not 
Blaga’s. Blaga is aware that pragmatic validation is not inerrant, and 
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Conclusion 
It may seem rather far-fetched to argue that Blaga, a very 
Continental philosopher whose works contain few references to 
American Pragmatism, is himself a Pragmatist. It may seem that 
such a project is the folly of an American philosopher who wants to 
impose his own tradition onto another’s work. Nonetheless, I think 
that this article shows that a strong argument for the Pragmatism of 
Blaga’s epistemology can be made. 
The two essential features of American Pragmatism are its 
repudiation of epistemological strategies that aim at apodictic 
certainty and its proposal of a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness. 
Any philosopher who does not share these two features is not a 
Pragmatist. Likewise, any philosopher who does embrace them can 
be regarded, at least in his or her epistemology, as a Pragmatist. 
Blaga rejects the goal of apodictic certainty on a number of 
grounds. He also advocates a pragmatic criterion of truthfulness. 
Therefore Blaga is (can be considered) a Pragmatist. 
Pragmatism is currently experiencing a revival in America. 
New arguments have been formulated in its support, and its 
proponents include many of America’s leading philosophers. That 
Blaga embraced a similar philosophy more than half a century ago 
reflects his insight as a philosopher. Perhaps his works contain 
other insights that would be useful to contemporary philosophy as 
well.
